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By MARCO PAGANO AND PAOLO F. VOLPIN*
We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our
model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor
protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This predic-
tion is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the
voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a
panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel
of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes,
especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional
explanatory power only for employment protection. (JEL G34, K22, K42)
Recent works on corporate governance show
large differences in the degree of investor pro-
tection between countries, correlated both with
the development of capital markets and with the
ownership structure of firms.1 These studies
take the degree of investor protection as exog-
enous. Laws result from the political process,
however, which in turn responds to economic
interests. In this sense, legal rules and economic
outcomes are jointly determined, politics being
the link between them.
In this paper, we apply this principle to the
choice of the degree of investor and employ-
ment protection. We investigate whether a
political theory can explain the observed inter-
national differences in regulation. This question
has an obvious bearing on the issue of legal
reform, because understanding the determinants
of regulation in a given country is a prerequisite
to predicting its evolution.
Currently, the consensus explanation of the
international differences in investor protection
is that they are rooted in the structure of the
legal system, which is historical in origin. This
approach—proposed by La Porta et al. (1998),
hereafter LLSV (1998)—is based on the classi-
fication of legal systems into four “families”:
the English common-law system and the
French, German, and Scandinavian civil-law
traditions. LLSV show that shareholder protec-
tion is significantly higher in the common-law
countries.
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Though striking, these correlations per se do
not provide a theory of the determinants of
investor protection: there is no clear reason why
common law should provide noncontrolling
shareholders with better protection against in-
siders. In fact, in contrast with this view, there is
evidence that civil law has not always been less
suited to business needs than common law.2
Another problem with the “legal-origin ap-
proach” is that it lacks predictive power. Since
a country’s legal system is the outcome of
choices made centuries ago, this approach im-
plies that in civil-law countries noncontrolling
shareholders are doomed to weak legal protec-
tion, and that accordingly the stock market is
bound to remain underdeveloped. This hardly
squares, however, with the fact that reforms of
corporate law do occur in the real world and
have been particularly notable in recent years,
as corporate governance problems have come to
the fore in the policy debate.
This suggests that politicians can change
company law, if they choose to do so. So the
question becomes: when and why do they de-
cide to? Political economy models can help
answer this question by formalizing the behav-
ior of voters and politicians in response to their
economic interest as well as to their ideology. In
these models, the voting process aggregates the
conflicting preferences of voters, and the State
serves as agent for the constituencies that pre-
vail. This approach has been applied exten-
sively to the design of fiscal and monetary
policy, but can serve the study of company and
labor law equally well.3 In this paper we at-
tempt a first step in this direction by developing
a stylized model of the political economy of
financial and labor market regulation, and by
testing its predictions on a new panel of inter-
national data.
We model an economy with three types of
agents: entrepreneurs, rentiers, and workers.4
After entrepreneurs have set up their firms, a
political vote can change the law. Therefore,
when signing contracts, people have to take the
possible outcome of elections into account. In
particular, the amount of equity finance that
external investors are willing to provide is af-
fected by the degree of protection that they
expect to receive from company law.
At the voting stage, political preferences are
shaped by economic motives. Rentiers, as mi-
nority shareholders, want strong investor pro-
tection to limit the private benefits extracted by
entrepreneurs at their expense. The latter, as
controlling shareholders, have the opposite
preference. As initial owners of their compa-
nies, they ultimately bear the agency cost of
weak investor protection, in the form of reduced
availability of equity capital. This cost is sunk,
however, at the voting stage: once companies
have raised external equity, entrepreneurs have
the incentive to weaken investor protection to
increase their private benefits.
If the political debate were only about the
degree of investor protection, this would be
trivially determined by the balance of power
between entrepreneurs and rentiers. Firms have
another important class of stakeholders, how-
ever: their employees. The latter’s interests can
loom large in the political debate, since they
represent a large fraction of the vote and tend to
be ideologically cohesive. As a result, the po-
litical debate is likely to extend to labor issues,
such as protection against dismissal. Accord-
ingly, we model the political agenda as center-
ing on the two main sets of laws that affect
stakeholders: company law, insofar as it sets the
degree of shareholder protection; and labor law,
insofar as it determines employee protection
against dismissal.
We assume that two parties (or political co-
alitions) compete for votes by committing to a
policy platform before the elections. Each con-
stituency’s voting behavior is determined by its
economic interests as well as by its ideological
2 The evidence in Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales
(2003) suggests that the finding that common-law countries
are more financially developed has not always been true.
For instance, they document that at the beginning of the
twentieth century, French capital markets were more devel-
oped than those of the United States. Naomi R. Lamoreaux
and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal (2004) produce evidence that in
the nineteenth century the French Code de commerce and
legal practice offered more sophisticated and flexible solu-
tions to organize business than the Anglo-American legal
regime.
3 For a comprehensive treatment of the political econ-
omy approach and of its applications to fiscal and monetary
policy, see Allan Drazen (2000) and Torsten Persson and
Guido Tabellini (2000).
4 Rentiers are people whose main source of income is
financial wealth. In the model they are noncontrolling
shareholders.
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bias toward one of the two parties. Voters also
have individual political preferences, which are
distributed differently across constituencies.
Entrepreneurs and employees are relatively ho-
mogeneous in their political preferences and are
biased toward one of the two parties. In con-
trast, the rest of the electorate—which includes
rentiers as well as self-employed and unem-
ployed workers—has more dispersed individual
preferences and a less pronounced bias for ei-
ther party.5
We show that the political outcome hinges
crucially on whether the electoral system is
proportional (where winning a majority of the
votes is crucial), or majoritarian (where winning
a majority of districts ensures victory). Our
main result is that a proportional system pro-
duces weak shareholder protection and strong
employment protection, i.e., an outcome favor-
able to entrepreneurs and employees and unfa-
vorable to the residual group.6 A majoritarian
system produces the opposite: strong share-
holder protection and weak employment protec-
tion, i.e., the outcome preferred by rentiers.
The intuition behind these results is that pro-
portional voting pushes political parties to cater
more to the preferences of social groups with
homogeneous preferences, that is, entrepreneurs
and employees. This is because under this vot-
ing rule the additional mass of voters that can be
attracted by shifting a party’s platform is greater
if the shift favors a homogeneous constituency.
Under a majoritarian system, by contrast, there
is keen competition for the votes of the pivotal
district, because this is enough to win the elec-
tions. In our model, the pivotal district coincides
with that dominated by the residual group, pre-
cisely because it is not ideologically committed
to either party, unlike employee- or entrepreneur-
dominated districts. Thus the very lack of ideo-
logical commitment that makes this residual
group neglected in a proportional system makes
it keenly courted in a majoritarian system.
To test these predictions, we first examine the
available cross-country data on investor protec-
tion, employment protection, and political vari-
ables. Continental European countries and
Japan, which tend to have proportional voting
systems, have weak investor and strong em-
ployment protection; Anglo-Saxon countries,
whose political systems tend to be majoritarian,
have the reverse. While this evidence is consis-
tent with the model’s predictions, it is difficult
to test them against those of the main competing
view that explains cross-country variation in
regulatory outcomes with the origin of the cor-
responding legal systems. The difficulty arises
from the high collinearity between political and
legal variables within a single cross section.
To overcome this problem, we construct an
international panel dataset for the 1990s by col-
lecting data on shareholder protection and
merging it with measures of employment pro-
tection and political variables. Using panel es-
timation techniques, we provide a tighter test of
the two competing theories. The proportionality
of the voting system is again found to be sig-
nificant and negatively correlated with share-
holder protection, and positively correlated with
employment protection. We explore also
whether other political variables—such as ideo-
logical factors, district size, voting thresholds,
competition among parties, and tenure of the
democratic system—affect the regulatory out-
comes, and we find that some of them play a
role, especially in shaping labor market regula-
tion. In contrast with the results obtained on
cross-sectional data, in the panel the origin of
the legal system has no additional explanatory
power for shareholder protection. Instead, it re-
tains an important role in the determination of
employment protection.
Our findings accord with the growing politi-
cal economy literature that identifies the differ-
ence between majoritarian and proportional
systems as a key variable in the design of eco-
nomic policy.7 Our contribution to this literature
5 Therefore, in our model voters are guided by a mix of
economic interest and ideology. This contrasts with others
who view voters as driven entirely by ideological factors.
For instance, Mark J. Roe (2000) attributes the differences
between the corporate governance systems in the United
States and in continental Europe to the incompatibility of
the American ideology with the social democracy common
in European countries. In his view, in Europe the state is
entrusted with the task of sustaining a social pact between
classes, whereby greater equality is exchanged for reduced
efficiency.
6 Pagano and Volpin (2005) show that a similar conver-
gence of interests between entrepreneurs (or managers) and
employees can occur also at the individual company level,
not just in the political arena as in this model.
7 Gian M. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) document the
existence of a strong and very robust positive relationship
between the degree of proportionality of the electoral sys-
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is to show that this variable is important also in
shaping financial and labor market regulation.
The degree of proportionality helps predict the
increase in the degree of shareholder protection
and the decline in the degree of employment
protection that occurred in the 1990s. These
changes in regulation, which are relevant to the
debate on corporate governance8 and labor re-
lation systems, cannot be explained by the in-
herently static legal-origin approach.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I
introduces the model and its main assumptions.
The baseline model is analyzed in Sections II
and III, and Section IV develops some exten-
sions. The empirical evidence is presented in
Section V. Section VI concludes.
I. Structure of the Model
Consider an economy with three types of
agents: R rentiers, W workers, and E entrepre-
neurs. Rentiers have only a wealth endowment,
AR. Workers have a unit endowment of labor
time per period, and a wealth endowment, AW 
0. Entrepreneurs have a wealth endowment AE
and an entrepreneurial idea, which is essential
to set up a firm.
Figure 1 illustrates the time line. At t  0 firms
are set up by hiring labor and raising capital.
Their founders can raise capital only by selling
equity stakes. The availability of equity finance
determines the scale of the company. Firms hire
workers who can invest in effort to raise their
productivity. In setting the initial price of equity
and wages, entrepreneurs, investors, and work-
ers take account of the legal rules expected to
prevail in the future. Once firms are set up,
workers split into two subgroups: employees
and self-employed (or unemployed) workers.
At t  1, elections are held, with either a
proportional or a majoritarian system. Voters
are guided by a mix of economic interest and
ideology. The members of each constituency
(employed workers, entrepreneurs, rentiers, and
self-employed workers) share both economic
interests and ideological bias toward a party, but
their preferences also have an ideological indi-
vidual component. Two parties compete for
votes by proposing platforms defined on two
dimensions of regulation: investor protection
and employment protection. The first affects the
corporate resources that owner-managers can
appropriate at the expense of other sharehold-
ers, that is, the private benefits of control. The
second affects their discretion to reduce labor
costs.
At t  2, entrepreneurs learn the individual
productivity of their employees. Established en-
trepreneurs can restructure their companies at a
profit by replacing less productive workers with
new, less expensive ones. The feasibility of this
depends on the degree of legal protection of
employed workers.
At t  3, wages are paid, the owner-manager
extracts private benefits of control, and divi-
dends are distributed to shareholders.
tem and the size of transfer spending in OECD countries.
Persson and Tabellini (2004) analyze the impact of the
choice between proportional and majoritarian electoral rules
on a broad range of fiscal policy choices. They provide
evidence that majoritarian systems tend to have smaller
governments, less welfare spending, and lower deficits than
proportional systems.
8 Legal scholars are divided over the degree of conver-
gence that we are likely to see in corporate law, in contrac-
tual behavior, and in business practices. Henri B. Hansmann
and Reinier H. Kraakman (2001) argue that shareholder
pressure will ensure gradual convergence in corporate law
as well. John C. Coffee (1999) suggests that corporate
governance will converge via actual business practices.
Ronald J. Gilson (2001) argues that one is likely to observe
interplay of all three types of convergence, with a range of
different potential outcomes. In contrast, Lucian A. Beb-
chuk and Roe (1999) question the idea of smooth and rapid
convergence toward a single system of corporate gover-
nance, since political and economic forces tend to promote
path dependence in corporate law and in business practice.
FIGURE 1. TIME LINE
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The rentiers’ objective function UR is simply
the final value of their wealth. They can invest
either in the representative company’s shares or
in an alternative asset (“debt”) yielding a fixed
rate of return, for simplicity normalized to zero.
So their objective function is UR  RV  BR,
where R is their equity stake, V is the value of
the company (its cash flow net of the private
benefits), and BR is their debt holding.
Workers’ expected utility is UW  E(c)  e,
where c is their consumption,  is the (positive)
marginal disutility of effort, and the effort e can
take two values, 0 or 1. Workers, like rentiers,
can invest in equity or debt and they receive a
wage w if employed. Therefore, the consump-
tion of employed workers is c  w˜  WV 
BW, where w˜ is their wage (a random variable
because it depends on whether they are retained
or fired), W is their equity stake, and BW is their
debt holding. Unemployed workers instead con-
sume c  WV  BW because they have no
labor income.
Entrepreneurs maximize the value of the
stake retained in their company (their percent-
age stake E multiplied by the value of the
company, V) plus the resources diverted from
the company (their private benefits of control,
D). Since in this model entrepreneurs invest
all their wealth in their company (as shown
below), their objective function is UE 
EV  D.
The model takes as exogenous the electoral
system (majoritarian or proportional), the
number of agents of each type, technology
and preferences, wealth and labor endow-
ments. It determines endogenously the degree
of investor and employee protection, private
benefits of control, wages and employment,
investment, and the equity stake of each type
of investor.
Let us now explain the assumptions of the
model in greater detail.
A. Firms
Firms have a fixed-coefficients production
technology, with labor-capital ratio N/K  n.
The production of Y units requires N workers
and K units of capital, with Y  yN (y being
average labor productivity). A worker’s produc-
tivity can be low (equal to y) or high (equal
to y  ). An employee becomes a high-
productivity worker with probability x if he
invests in effort (e  1), and remains a low-
productivity worker otherwise (e  0). Effort
captures investment in firm-specific human cap-
ital. It can be undertaken only by workers hired
at t  0, and is not observable. It is efficient to
elicit effort, since its marginal productivity ex-
ceeds its disutility: x  . To induce workers
to exert effort, the firm must agree to pay a
sufficiently high wage. The contractual wage
cannot be made contingent on workers’ individ-
ual productivity, which is assumed to be observ-
able but not contractible.9
To raise the external capital K  AE, the
entrepreneur needs to sell shares in the firm.10
We assume a perfectly elastic supply of capital,
as in a small open economy. The required rate
of return on equity is normalized to zero, so that
investors must break even in expectation. The
entrepreneur’s stake E is determined by the
external investors’ participation constraint (1 
E)V  K  AE. The value of the company V is
endogenous: once financial and labor contracts
are signed, V is reduced by the amount of pri-
vate benefits that the law allows the entrepre-
neur to extract. We assume that in order to keep
control of the company (and extract private
benefits) the entrepreneur’s stake E must meet
a threshold level *.11
9 Our model could accommodate the presence of debt,
but in this stylized modeling of the agency problem, exter-
nal debt and equity would not be intrinsically different,
except for the possibly different degree of legal protection
afforded to creditors and shareholders. In a richer model,
debt and equity contracts would pay in different states of
nature, and would thus be intrinsically different. Enrico
Perotti and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (2003) explore a
political economy model where creditors tend to side with
employees against shareholders.
10 We view the noncontractibility of individual produc-
tivity as a feature of production technology. One could
equivalently assume that individual productivity is contract-
ible, but employment protection legislation constrains the
extent to which contracts can be made contingent on indi-
vidual productivity. The reason is that contingent contracts
could be effectively used to fire low-productivity workers
by paying them less than their reservation wage. (Under this
interpretation, the employment protection parameter  that
will be introduced below would be the probability that a
court would not enforce such a contingent contract.)
11 As shown by Bebchuk (1999), the entrepreneurs’ de-
cision to retain control depends on the magnitude of the
private benefits conferred by control. Here we are implicitly
assuming that these benefits are large enough to make
control desirable, even when shareholder protection is
strong.
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At t  0 the entrepreneur chooses the scale of
the investment K once and for all, so as to
maximize his objective function. Given the lin-
earity of the production technology, if capital is
productive, he invests as much as possible; oth-
erwise, not at all. To guarantee investment, we
assume that the minimal profit per worker, y,
exceeds the cost of capital per worker, 1/n.
Therefore, the size of the representative com-
pany, K, is determined by the sum of the entre-
preneur’s initial wealth AE and of any equity
finance that he can raise.
B. Political Decision
At t  1 two political parties (or coalitions)
compete for votes, designing their platforms
so as to maximize their chances of winning.
The electoral system is assumed to be either
proportional (nationwide) or majoritarian
(single-member districts). In the former, the
winner is the party that gets the majority of
the votes, in the latter the one that wins the
majority of districts. We defer a detailed de-
scription of the political stage of the game to
Section III.
The policy platforms of the two parties con-
cern employment protection, , and shareholder
protection, , where (, )  [0,  ]  [0,  ].
The labor and financing contracts signed at t 
0 shape the economic interests of individuals,
and therefore their political preferences, as we
shall see in Section II D.
C. Reorganization
At t  2, the entrepreneur learns the individ-
ual productivity of his employees. If an em-
ployee is retained, he must receive the wage
contractually agreed at t  0. If an employee is
fired, he can be replaced with a new worker,
whose productivity is y because he can no
longer acquire firm-specific human capital. This
worker is hired at the competitive wage rate wc,
which equals the reservation utility associated
with self-employment. To save notation, the
latter is set equal to zero, and so is the compet-
itive wage12: wc  0.
As we shall see below, the entrepreneur
has the incentive to fire the (1  x)N low-
productivity workers. He may be unable to
fire all of them, however, because the law
protects employment stability. We capture this
by assuming that an attempt to lay off an em-
ployee is voided by a court with probability 
(), which is increasing in employment pro-
tection . So the entrepreneur can replace at
most (1  )(1  x)N of his low-productivity
employees.
The function  captures the effectiveness
of judicial enforcement: better enforcement in-
creases an employee’s probability of retaining
his job, for a given degree of legal protection .
We assume that (0)  0 and that ( ) 
x(x  )/[  x(x  )]. We shall see that
this upper bound on the probability  ensures
that the firm wishes to elicit effort from its
employees—irrespective of the degree of em-
ployment protection.
D. Extraction of Private Benefits
The degree of investor protection chosen at
t  1 sets a ceiling D() on the private benefits
that entrepreneurs can extract at t  3. This
ceiling is proportional to the size of the com-
pany and is decreasing in the degree of share-
holder protection : D  d()K, with derivative
D/  d()K  0 everywhere.
II. Equilibrium
In this section we derive the model’s sub-
game perfect equilibria. Therefore, the model is
solved backward, from t  3 to t  0. First, we
determine the amount of managerial diversion
D at t  3. Second, we consider the restructur-
ing phase at t  2. Next, we derive the cash
flows and the value of the firm at t  1. Then,
we characterize the political preferences of en-
trepreneurs, workers, and rentiers, but stop short
of solving for the equilibrium values of  and 
chosen in the political arena at t  1. Instead,
we derive the companies’ ownership structure
and equilibrium labor contracts set at t  0 as a
function of the expected legal regime. We post-
pone the determination of the political equilib-
rium to Section III, where the political subgame
is modeled in two alternative fashions, depend-
ing on voting rules.
12 To break the tie, we assume that at this wage a worker
prefers to become an employee to remaining self-employed.
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A. Private Benefits of Control
At t  3 production generates a profit 	 
(y  w )N, the average wage w and the average
productivity y having been determined at t  2.
Since D is diverted in the form of private ben-
efits, dividends are 	  D. The level of private
benefits that maximizes the owner-manager’s
utility, conditional on his stake E and on share-
holder protection , solves
(1) max
DD

E
		 D
 D.
It is easy to see that the amount appropriated
by the owner-manager is decreasing in the de-
gree of investor protection. Since E  1, the
maximum is a corner solution: diversion is set at
its upper bound D  D(), which by assump-
tion is a decreasing function of .
B. Restructuring
Assuming that employees exert effort, a frac-
tion x of them become high-productivity work-
ers, the others low-productivity workers. The
entrepreneur retains the former and fires as
many of the latter as he is allowed to, i.e., (1 
)(1  x)N, replacing them with new hires at
the competitive wage. This increases the firm’s
profits by (1  )(1  x)Nw, since the com-
pany saves the efficiency wage w of each of
these workers (recall that the competitive wage
is standardized at zero).
After restructuring, therefore, the firm has x
high-productivity workers and 1  x low-
productivity ones. Average productivity is thus
y  y  x. High-productivity workers are paid
w. Among low-productivity workers, those
hired at t  0 and not fired at t  2 earn the
efficiency wage w, while those replaced at t  2
earn the competitive wage 0. Hence, the average
wage is w  [x  (1  x)()]w, which is
increasing in the degree of employment protec-
tion .
C. Value of the Firm
At t  1, the value of the company is equal to
profits less the private benefits of control, V 
	 D. Recalling that 	 (y  w )N and using
the expressions just found for the average pro-
ductivity and wage, the company’s value at t 
1 can then be written as:
(2) V1  y 
 x
	 x
 
1	 x
wN 	 D
.
This expression shows that the value of the
company is decreasing in the degree of em-
ployment protection . Greater employment
protection increases labor costs and thereby
reduces profits by preventing the replacement
of incumbent low-productivity workers with
new hires. The value of the company is also
increasing in shareholder protection , since
private benefits D are a decreasing function of
this parameter.
D. Political Preferences
As a result of the creation of firms, the initial
three types of economic agents turn into four
political constituencies: entrepreneurs, rentiers,
employees, and self-employed (or unemployed)
workers. In this section we analyze how  and 
affect their expected utility as of t  1, neglect-
ing debt holdings, which are unaffected by these
parameters.
Entrepreneurs favor weak employment pro-
tection and weak shareholder protection:
(3) UE  E V1 
 D
.
Rentiers favor weak employment protection
and strong shareholder protection, since both
increase the value of their shareholdings:
(4) UR  R V1 .
The political preferences of workers depend
on whether they are employed by firms or not.
Employees favor the greatest possible degree of
labor protection,13 and also shareholder protec-
tion insofar as they own shares:
(5) UW  x
 
1	 x
w
 WV1 	 e.
13 This requires that workers do not own the entire firm
(NW  1), which holds by assumption, since the entrepre-
neur owns a positive stake *.
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In contrast, self-employed workers favor
weak employment protection and strong share-
holder protection, insofar as they have any eq-
uity holdings. Their expected utility as of t  1
can be written as (1  x)(1  ())wc 
WV1  WV1, where we use the assumption
that the competitive wage wc  0. The self-
employed thus share the political preferences of
rentiers, so the two groups will be lumped to-
gether and referred to as “residual” voters, for
whom we retain the letter R used so far to label
rentiers.
The political preferences of each type of
agent as of t  1 are contained in Table 1.
Postponing full analysis of the political equi-
librium to Section III, let us derive the initial
labor contract and ownership structure, taking 
and  as given. These two parameters will be
determined by the political process at t  1, but
we assume that at t  0 economic agents form
rational expectations of the political outcome,
and contract accordingly.
E. Equilibrium Labor Contract
Suppose that at t  0 the firm wishes to offer
a wage w capable of eliciting effort from work-
ers. Knowing that in the reorganization phase
they can be fired with some probability, workers
are interested in their expected wage. If an
employee exerts effort, the expected wage is
[x  (1  x)()]w.14 If instead the employee
exerts no effort, his productivity is always low
and he gets the wage only owing to employment
protection, that is, with probability . There-
fore, his expected income is w.
Hence, to elicit effort the wage w must satisfy
the incentive-compatibility constraint:
(6) x 
 
1 	 x
w 	   
w
where the left-hand side is the worker’s utility
with effort (expected wage minus disutility
of effort) and the right-hand side his utility
with no effort. Profit maximization by em-
ployers ensures that the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint (6) holds with equality. This
yields the following expression for the effi-
ciency wage:
(7) w  
x
1 	 
 .
The wage w is increasing in the degree of
employment protection , because greater
protection lowers the probability  of being
fired, making the required efficiency wage
larger. Note that this wage level ensures that
the workers’ participation constraint is also
met, since reservation utility is normalized to
zero.
From equation (7), the expected wage of a
worker hired at t  0 is [x  (1  x)()]w 
z(), where z()  1  ()/[x(1  ())] 
1. The expected wage exceeds the cost of effort,
as firms must pay efficiency wages. It is increas-
ing in employment protection  because the
efficiency wage w is increasing in . Obviously
z() is also the cost of a worker to the firm, so
that from equation (2) the firm’s value as of t 
0 is:
(8) V0  y 
 x 	 z
N 	 D
.
This expression shows that at t  0 the value
of the firm is decreasing in the degree of
employment protection (since the expected
labor cost increases with ) and increasing in
the degree of shareholder protection (since
the private benefits of control decrease
with ).
The foregoing derivations rest on the assump-
tion that the firm wants to elicit effort from its
employees. This is true provided the firm’s ex-
pected gain x from incentivizing an employee
exceeds the cost of paying an efficiency wage
z(). Since the latter is increasing in employment
protection , this condition is satisfied for any
value of  if it holds for the maximal employment
14 The first term refers to the high-productivity state:
in this state, which occurs with probability x, the worker
always receives the agreed wage w because the firm has
no incentive to fire him. The second term refers to the
low-productivity state. This occurs with probability 1 
x, and the worker is retained with probability , so that
he is paid the wage with probability (1  x).
TABLE 1—POLITICAL PREFERENCES
Type of agent
Effect of 
on utility
Effect of 
on utility
Entrepreneur Negative Negative
Employed worker Positive Positive
Rentier, unemployed,
self-employed
Positive Negative
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2protection  . This amounts to the assumption on
( ) made in Section I C.
F. Equilibrium Ownership Structure
At t  0, the entrepreneur chooses the scale
of investment to maximize the value of his stake
in the company plus his private benefits of
control:
(9) max
K
EV0 
 DEy
 x	z
nK
 d
K
 d
K
where in the second step we use equation (8)
and the definitions of N and D. This maximiza-
tion problem must take account of the investors’
participation constraint:
(10 ) E  1 	
K 	 AE
V0
 1	
K	 AE
y
 x	z
nK	 d
K
and the entrepreneur’s need to retain the con-
trolling stake E  *.
Solving this problem, one finds that the en-
trepreneur chooses to retain only the control
stake *. He will choose firm size:
(11) K*  AE1 	 
1 	 *y 
 x 	 z
n 	 d

and his implied level of utility will be:
(12) U*E  AE 
 y
 x	 z
n	 1K*.
From expressions (11) and (12), we immedi-
ately obtain:
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal scale of the
company and the entrepreneur’s ex ante utility
are strictly increasing in the degree of share-
holder protection , and decreasing in employ-
ment protection .
PROOF:
See Appendix.
A low degree of shareholder protection and a
high degree of employment protection create ex
ante inefficiency by causing equity rationing. If
entrepreneurs could commit to strong share-
holder protection, they would do so, because
this would increase their utility. Raising share-
holder protection implies a Pareto gain. Entre-
preneurs benefit, while rentiers and workers are
indifferent, since perfect competition ensures
that they maintain their reservation level of util-
ity. Here we assume that entrepreneurs cannot
precommit to support such regulation, but in
Section IV A we discuss ways in which such
precommitment could be achieved.
By determining the entrepreneur’s optimal
stake E *, the model pins down the aggregate
equity stake of outside investors but leaves the
stakes of the representative rentier R and of the
representative worker W indeterminate. These
may depend on transaction costs, taxation, social
security, privatization policy, and other institutional
arrangements that we do not model explicitly.
III. Political Equilibrium
As is shown in Section II D, at t  1 there are
three distinct groups of voters: entrepreneurs
(E), employed workers (W), and a residual
group (R) formed by rentiers, unemployed
workers, and self-employed workers, whose
utilities are represented in equations (3), (4),
and (5). We assume that two parties (or coali-
tions), A and B, compete for their votes and that
no single group is an absolute majority. We
denote groups by j  E, R, W, and parties by
p  A, B. The entrepreneurs are a fraction sE 
E/(E  R  W) of the total population. Em-
ployed workers are a fraction sW  EN/(E 
R  W). The size of residual group is sR  1 
sW  sE.
Our model of the electoral competition is an
adaptation of the setting proposed by Persson
and Tabellini (1999) to compare the perfor-
mance of majoritarian and proportional sys-
tems. Parties commit to policy platforms, qA
and qB respectively, before the vote. The policy
q is a two-dimensional vector (, )  [0,  ] 
[0,  ]. In setting their platforms qA and qB,
parties act simultaneously and do not cooperate.
Each seeks to win the election because the win-
ner enjoys a nonmonetary rent.
We assume probabilistic voting to ensure
the existence of a voting equilibrium. In
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one-dimensional voting problems, two-party
competition is known to produce the median
voter result. But in our setting, where voters’
preferences are expressed on two dimensions,
cycling problems emerge. These problems
vanish if there is uncertainty about the pref-
erences of each voter (Dennis C. Mueller,
1989). Specifically, we assume that voter i in
group j votes for party A if
(13) Uj 
qA Uj
qB
 ˜ 
 ˜ij
where ˜ reflects the general popularity of
party B and is uniformly distributed on [1/
(2), 1/(2)], while ˜ij   j  ˜ij reflects
voter i’s ideological preference for party B.
The parameter  j is the group-specific ideo-
logical preference for party B. The term
˜ij is idiosyncratic to voter i and differs
across groups: it is uniformly distributed on
[1/(2j), 1/(2j)], where the parameter
j is an index of group j’s ideological
cohesion.
We take party A to be right wing, i.e., ideo-
logically close to entrepreneurs, and party B to
be left wing, i.e., close to workers. The residual
group is not biased toward either party, i.e., on
average has no ideological preference:
(14)  E     R  0 W  
where   0. We also assume this group to
have more dispersed ideological preferences
than the other two:
(15) E  W    0  R .
Indeed, this social group is more heteroge-
neous, as it includes voters as different as
rentiers, self-employed workers, and unem-
ployed workers, and unlike entrepreneurs and
employees, all of these lack trade associations
that aggregate and direct their votes toward a
party.
Before proceeding to the description of the
electoral rules, we must determine the probabil-
ity that each group j will vote for party A
conditional on the general popularity factor ˜.
In each group there is a voter k who is indiffer-
ent between the two parties. For this voter, the
ideological component is such that ˜kj 
Uj(qA)  Uj(qB)  ˜   j. All voters with an
individual ideological preference   ˜kj vote
for party A. The others prefer party B. Hence,
the fraction of individuals in group j voting for
party A is:
(16) p˜A,j jUj
qA	 Uj
qB	 ˜ 	  j

1
2 .
In what follows we consider two different
electoral systems: in Section III A the propor-
tional and in Section III B the majoritarian. In
Section III C we compare the systems and dis-
cuss the results.
A. Proportional Electoral System
In a proportional electoral system, the party
with the absolute majority of the votes will win
the election. Hence, the probability that party A
wins the election is:
(17) pA  Prob
j
sjp˜A,j 
1
2 
where p˜A, j is given by (16). Integrating with
respect to the general popularity factor ˜, equa-
tion (17) becomes:
(18) pA

 j sjjUj
qA	 Uj
qB	  j
 12
where   ¥j sjj is the average degree of
ideological cohesion, which can be regarded
as a measure of the importance of ideology in
voting. Expression (18) indicates that, under
proportional voting, the importance of each
constituency in affecting the electoral out-
come depends both on its demographic
weight sj and on its ideological cohesion
j. The intuition is that the larger and the
more cohesive a group, the larger the mass of
voters who can be attracted by a change in the
political platform toward their preferred
policy.
Party A will choose the platform qA to
maximize the probability of winning in (18),
while taking the opponent’s, qB, as given.
Symmetrically, party B will choose qB to
maximize its probability of winning, 1  pA,
taking qA as given. The following proposition
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describes the symmetrical Nash equilibrium
outcome.
PROPOSITION 2: Under a proportional elec-
toral rule, in equilibrium the winning political
platform is qP  (P, P)  (0,  ), that is, weak
shareholder protection and strong employment
protection.
PROOF:
See Appendix.
The intuition is that proportional voting
pushes political parties to cater to the prefer-
ences of the social groups with homogeneous
preferences: entrepreneurs and employees.
This is because under this voting rule the
number of extra voters who can be won over
by altering the platform is greater if the shift
is in favor of a more homogeneous constitu-
ency. In our setting, the residual group of
rentiers, self-employed workers, and unem-
ployed workers is the most heterogeneous,
and under proportional voting it gets the short
straw.
B. Majoritarian Electoral System
In a majoritarian electoral system, the party
that wins more districts wins the election. We
assume that there are three districts and that
each district contains only voters belonging to a
single group: the voters of district 1 are entre-
preneurs, those of district 3 are employed work-
ers, and those of district 2 belong to the residual
group. The argument generalizes to any odd
number of districts, if the number of districts of
each type is approximately proportional to the
fractions of the three groups. Under appropriate
conditions on the parameters, the model gener-
alizes also to the case in which districts do not
coincide perfectly with political groups.15
To guarantee the existence of a voting equi-
librium under the majoritarian rule, one must
assume that the entrepreneurs’ ideological bias
to party A and that of the workers to party B are
strong enough (that is,  is sufficiently large), as
in Persson and Tabellini (1999). This condition,
which is derived in the Appendix, ensures that
there exists a symmetrical equilibrium in pure
strategies in which the two parties announce the
same platform, and competition takes place
only in district 2, which is populated by the
residual group. Districts 1 and 3 are never piv-
otal, because party A is so likely to win district
1 and lose district 3 that both parties are con-
cerned only to win over the voters of dis-
trict 2.16
Therefore, the probability of party A winning
is simply the probability of it obtaining the
majority of district-2 votes:
(19) pA  Probp˜A,R  1/2
 UR
qA	 UR
qB
 1/2.
We conclude:
PROPOSITION 3: Under a majoritarian elec-
toral rule, the winning political platform in a
symmetrical equilibrium is qM  (M, M) 
( , 0), that is, strong shareholder protection
and weak employment protection.
PROOF:
See Appendix.
15 As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the existence
of a symmetric equilibrium requires only that the district
inhabited by the residual group is pivotal. The entrepreneur-
and employee-dominated districts are not pivotal when the
ideological bias of entrepreneurs and workers toward their
respective party is sufficiently large that the competing
party cannot win them over. If entrepreneurs and employees
represent only a simple majority of the inhabitants in their
districts rather than the totality, the conditions for the exis-
tence of the equilibrium become more stringent, in the sense
that greater ideological polarization of workers and entre-
preneurs is required.
16 The analysis in this section can be generalized to the
case in which other districts are pivotal, by assuming that
there is uncertainty on the pivotal district. With this gener-
alization, parties effectively maximize a social surplus de-
fined by the weighted average of the utility of all social
groups, where the weights are the probabilities that each
district (group) will be pivotal. Even in this more general
case, in the majoritarian system the preferences of rentiers
affect the outcome more than in the proportional system. To
understand why, recall that the political weight of the
rentiers in a proportional system is inversely related to their
ideological dispersion, and therefore under our assumptions
is very low. In a majoritarian system their weight is likely to
be greater, because it is given by the probability of their
district’s being pivotal, which is unaffected by ideological
dispersion.
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The intuition is that a majoritarian system
creates keen competition for the pivotal district,
because this is what wins the elections. In our
model, this district coincides with the voters in
the residual group, who, unlike employees or
entrepreneurs, are ideologically uncommitted.
Thus the very lack of ideological commitment
that makes this residual group politically ne-
glected in a proportional system makes it the
most keenly courted constituency in a majori-
tarian system.
C. Comparison between Electoral Systems
For brevity, we label the outcome predicted
by Proposition 2 under the proportional system
as “corporatist,” insofar as it combines the pref-
erences of employers and employees, at the
expense of other social groups. This contrasts
with the “noncorporatist” outcome that obtains
under the majoritarian system according to
Proposition 3. The hallmark of the corporatist
outcome is that the policy parameter  is set at
a higher level and  at a lower level.
Hence the empirical prediction of these two
propositions: (a) in a cross-section of countries
with different electoral systems, investor and
employment protection should be negatively
correlated; and (b) proportional systems should
be associated with the corporatist outcome and
majoritarian systems with the noncorporatist. In
Section V we examine to what extent these
predictions are consistent with the data.17
IV. Extensions
In this section, we discuss three possible ex-
tensions of the model. In our model, legal rules
are chosen after firms are created. In Section IV
A we discuss how changing this timing would
affect the results. In Section IV B we present an
extension in which some firms are created after
the elections. Finally, in Section IV C we con-
sider how the model’s predictions would
change if, as a consequence of the diffusion of
“equity culture,” the political cohesion of mi-
nority shareholders were to increase. These ex-
tensions will be seen to yield interesting
predictions. Insofar as existing firms need to
raise additional finance or new firms are created
after the elections, even a proportional electoral
system may support shareholder protection. The
same result obtains also if there is a sufficient
increase in the political cohesion of minority
shareholders. Therefore, the need to raise fresh
capital by firms and the diffusion of “equity
culture” among investors may lead to better
corporate governance legislation, even in the
context of a proportional voting system.
A. Timing of the Elections
In our model, legal rules are chosen after
firms have been created. The rationale is that
often the legal rules can be changed after con-
tracts have been signed. The results of the
model would be very different if the rules could
not be changed once firms were created, share-
holder and employee protection perhaps being
enshrined in the constitution and not changeable
by the normal legislative process.
If such regulatory “lock-in” were possible,
shareholder protection  would be set at its
highest level to avoid the inefficiency arising
from equity rationing. Instead, employment
protection  would depend on the relative po-
litical power of workers and other classes, since
the expected wage is increasing in  (see Sec-
tion II E). Locking into low employment pro-
tection would be efficient, as it would minimize
the cost of motivating workers, but would re-
duce their expected incomes, thus generating an
ex ante trade-off between efficiency and distri-
butional equity. But in practice both shareholder
and employment protection are set by ordinary
legislation, so such “lock-in” is not realistic. An
alternative potential “lock-in” mechanism is
available if entrepreneurs and financiers can
“contract out” of their national legal system by
listing the company in a foreign exchange or
incorporating it in a jurisdiction featuring better
shareholder protection.18
A second important issue related to the tim-
ing of the model is whether companies go back
to the capital market after they have been started
up. We assume that they need capital only at t 
17 Combining the results in this section with Proposition
1, we also predict less investment and more unemployment
in countries with proportional elections.
18 This mechanism is discussed by Coffee (1999) and
Gilson (2001). Relevant evidence is provided by Pagano et
al. (2001) and William A. Reese, Jr., and Michael S. Weis-
bach (2002).
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0, so that at t  1 entrepreneurs want poor
investor protection in order to maximize their
private benefits. If entrepreneurs needed exter-
nal financing again later, then their political
preferences at t  1 might be different: they
might prefer strong investor protection to re-
duce the future cost of capital. Our assumption
remains reasonable if firms need more external
financing at the start-up than afterward.
B. Entry of New Entrepreneurs
In this section we extend the model by
assuming that at t  1 workers know that
with some probability at t  2, they will have
the option of becoming entrepreneurs by hir-
ing unskilled workers and raising equity cap-
ital (in this extension, the market for capital is
taken to still be open at that date, like the
market for labor). Suppose that they intend to
avail themselves of this opportunity. This ex-
pected future change of role could make them
politically more favorable to shareholder pro-
tection in the present. To see this point most
graphically, assume that workers have no eq-
uity stake in their portfolios (W  0) and
ignore labor income.
With steps similar to those followed in Sec-
tion II F to derive equations (11) and (12), one
can show that at t  2 they will be able to create
a firm of size
(20) K*W 
AW
1 	 
1 	 *yn 	 d
 .
Accordingly, their expected utility as of t  1 is:
(21) UW  AW 
 
ny 	 1

AW
1 	 
1 	 *yn 	 d

where  is the probability of becoming an en-
trepreneur. This expression is increasing in the
degree of shareholder protection :
(22) UW

 
ny	 1

AW
1	*d

1	 
1	*yn	 d
2 0.
Clearly, the greater the probability  of becom-
ing an entrepreneur after the elections, the more
workers’ voting preference will shift toward
shareholder protection. This implies that in a
proportional voting system, a party that tries to
maximize the probability of winning in expres-
sion (18) will assign a greater weight to share-
holder protection. For a sufficiently high value
of , even in a proportional voting system the
equilibrium political platform may go over to a
positive value of .
C. Equity Culture
It is often claimed that the recent diffusion of
equity ownership in many countries has been
accompanied by a greater awareness of the im-
portance of investor protection, as well as by
more active lobbying by institutional investors
for the reform of corporate governance. In our
model, this translates into greater political co-
hesion of the “residual group,” which includes
minority shareholders. A simple way to capture
this is to assume, in contrast with Section III,
that the ideological cohesion of this group ex-
ceeds that of the other constituencies, that is,
0  .
Under this assumption, by proceeding through
the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1,
it is easy to show that under a proportional
voting rule the outcome would be strong inves-
tor protection and weak employment protection.
In other words, the political outcome would be
qP  (P, P)  ( , 0), just as under a majori-
tarian voting rule. This suggests that the dif-
fusion of equity culture can lead to better
corporate governance legislation even in the
context of a proportional voting system.
V. Empirical Evidence
In this section we test the main implications
of the model, using measures of shareholder
protection, employment protection, and proxies
for the political variables suggested by the
model. First, we show that OECD countries
cluster in two groups, as predicted by Proposi-
tions 2 and 3: corporatist countries, with weak
shareholder protection and strong employment
protection, and noncorporatist countries, with
the opposite pattern. Internationally, therefore,
we observe a negative correlation between
shareholder and employee protection. Second,
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we investigate the determinants of shareholder
and employment protection, comparing the pre-
dictive power of the model’s political approach
and of the established legal-origin approach,
within a panel of 45 countries comprising both
OECD and developing nations. The entire dataset
and details about definitions and sources are avail-
able in the Web Appendix at http://www.e-aer.
org/data/sept05_data_pagano.zip.
A. Shareholder Protection and Employee
Protection
Figure 2 plots an indicator of employment
protection against the LLSV measure of share-
holder protection for 21 OECD countries. These
indicators are the empirical counterparts of the
parameters  and  in our model, respectively.
The measure of employment protection is the
1990 average of the OECD Employment Pro-
tection Legislation (EPL) indicator for regular
contracts (procedural inconveniences, notice
and severance pay for no-fault individual dis-
missals, difficulty of dismissal) and for short-
term contracts, published by Giuseppe Nicoletti
and Stefano Scarpetta (2001). The measure of
shareholder protection is the “anti-director
rights” index of shareholder protection com-
piled by LLSV (1998), which is the sum of
six dummy variables, capturing whether: (a)
proxy by mail is allowed; (b) shares are not
blocked before a shareholder meeting; (c)
cumulative voting for directors is allowed;
(d) oppressed minorities are protected; (e) the
share capital required to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting is less than 10 percent; and
(f) shareholders have preemptive rights at new
equity offerings. The values of the two indica-
tors are reported in the first two columns of
Table 2.
The two variables plotted in Figure 2 are
inversely correlated, as shown by the fitted re-
gression line: their correlation is 0.62, with a
p-value of 0.3 percent. This result is consistent
with the first empirical prediction of our model,
highlighted in Section III C.
The observations appear to cluster into two
distinct groups: the countries of continental Eu-
FIGURE 2. EMPLOYEE AND SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
Notes: “Employment protection legislation” is the OECD 1990 average of indicators on
regular contracts (procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual
dismissals, difficulty of dismissal), short-term contract (fixed-term and temporary), and
collective dismissals. Values increase with the strictness of protection (Nicoletti and Scar-
petta, 2001). “Shareholder protection” is the anti-director rights indicator from Table 2 of
LLSV (1998).
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rope and Japan, which to varying extents feature
the corporatist outcome, and Anglo-Saxon
countries, which feature the noncorporatist out-
come. Our model suggests that electoral sys-
tems should differ systematically across the two
clusters: the former should be associated with
proportional voting systems, and the latter with
majoritarian ones.
To test this second prediction, we construct
an indicator of the degree of proportionality of
the voting system based on the World Bank
Database of Political Institutions (hereafter
WBDPI) described by Thorsten Beck et al.
(2001). We combine in a single indicator three
WBDPI dummy variables that describe the elec-
toral system: (a) PR, which equals one if at least
some candidates are elected via a proportional
rule (i.e., on the basis on the percentage of votes
received by their party), and zero otherwise; (b)
PLURALTY, which equals one if at least some
legislators are elected via a majoritarian rule
(i.e., a winner-take-all or first-past-the-post
rule), and zero otherwise; and (c) HOUSESYS,
which equals one if most seats are allocated via
a majoritarian rule, and zero if most seats are
allocated with a proportional rule. Our synthetic
indicator of proportionality is defined as: PR 
PLURALTY  HOUSESYS  2. This variable
TABLE 2—SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION, EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION, AND ELECTORAL RULES
Country
Shareholder
protection
(1)
Employment
protection
(1990) (2)
Proportionality
(1986–90 average)
(3)
English
legal origin
(4)
Australia 4 1.06 1 1
Austria 2 2.39 3 0
Belgium 0 3.02 3 0
Canada 5 0.63 0 1
Denmark 2 2.43 3 0
Finland 3 2.22 3 0
France 3 2.73 1 0
Germany 1 3.55 2 0
Greece 2 3.61 2 0
Ireland 4 1.00 3 1
Italy 1 4.15 3 0
Japan 4 2.64 0 0
Netherlands 2 3.06 3 0
New Zealand 4 1.01 0 1
Norway 4 3.09 3 0
Portugal 3 4.20 3 0
Spain 4 3.66 2 0
Sweden 3 3.45 3 0
Switzerland 2 1.27 2 0
United Kingdom 5 0.51 0 1
United States 5 0.22 0 1
Notes: “Shareholder protection” is the anti-director rights index designed by LLSV (1998): it
is the sum of six dummy variables, indicating if proxy by mail is allowed, shares are not
blocked before a shareholder meeting, cumulative voting for directors is allowed, oppressed
minorities are protected, the percentage of share capital required to call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting is less than 10 percent, and existing shareholders have preemptive rights
at new equity offerings. “Employment protection” is the EPL measure defined as the average
of indicators for regular contracts (procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for
no-fault individual dismissals, difficulty of dismissal) and short-term contracts (fixed-term and
temporary) in 1990. Values increase with the strictness of protection (Nicoletti and Scarpetta,
2001). Proportionality equals 3 if 100 percent of seats are assigned via a proportional rule, 2
if the majority of seats are assigned by this rule, 1 if a minority of seats is assigned
proportionally, and 0 if no seats are assigned in this way. It is defined as PR  PLURALTY 
HOUSESYS  2, which are variables drawn from the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions 2000 (hereafter WBDPI), and defined in Beck et al. (2002). English legal origin
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the origin of the legal system is the English law and
0 otherwise, based on LLSV (1998).
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equals 3 if all the seats are assigned via a
proportional rule (pure proportionality), 2 if the
majority of seats are assigned via this rule, 1 if
a minority of seats are assigned proportionally,
and 0 if no seats are assigned in this way (pure
majoritarianism).
The third column of Table 2 displays the
average value that this indicator of proportion-
ality took for each country in the 1986–1990
interval. This indicator is averaged over five
years and lagged relative to shareholder and
employment protection in order to capture the
likely delay and gradualism with which elec-
toral systems affect legislation. The OECD
countries that exhibit a higher degree of pro-
portionality tend to have stronger employment
protection and weaker shareholder protection,
in accordance with the second prediction of
our model. The correlation between proportion-
ality and shareholder protection is 0.65,
with a p-value of 0.1 percent, while the corre-
lation between proportionality and employ-
ment protection is 0.67, with a p-value of 0.9
percent.
The data shown in Figure 2, however, may be
as consistent with our model as with the well-
known legal-origin approach proposed by
LLSV (1998). As noticed above, a noncorpo-
ratist outcome tends to occur in Anglo-Saxon
countries, that is, to be associated with common
law. This is confirmed by the data in the fourth
column of Table 2, which show the LLSV
dummy for English legal origin. The correlation
of this variable with shareholder protection is
0.69, and with employment protection is
0.84.19
In Table 3 we take a first stab at assessing
the relative importance of the proportionality
variable and the legal-origin dummies as deter-
minants of shareholder and employment pro-
tection, using the cross-sectional data reported
in Table 2. Since according to our model these
two variables are jointly determined, we esti-
mate a system of seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR). Column 1 confirms the impression
conveyed by Figure 2: the proportionality of the
voting system is negatively correlated with
shareholder protection and positively associated
with employment protection. Column 2 indi-
cates that legal variables are at least as robustly
associated with our two regulatory indicators: in
particular the coefficient of the English legal-
origin dummy is highly significant in both re-
gressions, with a positive sign in the
shareholder protection regression and a nega-
tive one in the employment protection regres-
sion. In column 3 both legal and political
variables are included as regressors. The results
show that both legal origin and proportionality
are significantly related to shareholder pro-
tection, whereas only the coefficients of the
legal-origin variables retain their statistical sig-
nificance in the employment protection regres-
sion. The R2 of the regressions in Ta-
ble 3 indicates that the explanatory power of
legal origin exceeds that of our political vari-
able, and wipes it out completely for employ-
ment protection.
This conclusion may reflect, however, the
collinearity between the legal and political vari-
ables at a cross-sectional level. Indeed, English
legal origin has a strong inverse correlation
(0.69) with the proportionality of the voting
system. But this collinearity can be overcome
by exploiting both cross-sectional and time-
series variation in the data. To this purpose, we
extend the indicator constructed by LLSV
(1998) to the entire interval between 1993 and
2001, relying on the answers to questionnaires
sent to legal experts and business practitioners
around the world.20 Our panel includes 47 of the
original 49 countries studied by LLSV (1998),
since for Jordan and Sri Lanka there were no
responses to our questionnaire.21 Symmetri-
cally, we draw from Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2001) a panel of the OECD employment pro-
tection measure, spanning the 1990–1998 inter-
val. Finally, we construct a panel of political
indicators, including our measure of proportion-
ality, based on the WBDPI.
Table 4, which presents descriptive statistics
for this panel, reveals that there is some time-
series variation—though admittedly less than
cross-country variation—in shareholder and
employment protection, as well as in political
19 This correlation is consistent with the findings of the
recent study by Juan Botero et al. (2004) on the regulation
of labor markets.
20 Details on sources are available in the Web Appendix.
21 In our panel data regression, we have only 45 coun-
tries, because our political variables are not available for
Hong Kong and Nigeria.
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variables. To exemplify, shareholder protection
improved in 14 countries out of 47 countries.
The countries recording the largest increases are
Italy and South Korea (from 1 to 5 and from 1
to 4, respectively). The overall average rose
from 3.17 to 3.60. The proportionality of the
voting system changes in six countries.22 To
implement a systematic analysis of the correla-
tions between political variables, legal origin,
and regulatory outcomes, we resort to panel
data estimation. This approach allows to control
for the effect of unobservable heterogeneity that
can lead to spurious correlations, and thereby
produce unreliable cross-sectional estimates.
B. Explaining Shareholder Protection
Table 5 presents the results of panel regres-
sions on the determinants of shareholder protec-
tion. In columns 1 to 3, we reestimate the
specifications of Table 3 with maximum-
likelihood random effects on our panel. As in
the cross-sectional estimates, when introduced
separately, both the proportionality indicator
and the English legal-origin dummy enter the
regression with highly significant coefficients.
Again, shareholder protection is negatively cor-
related with proportionality and positively cor-
related with English legal origin. However,
when political and legal variables enter the list
of regressors jointly, only the coefficient of pro-
portionality retains its sign, magnitude, and sig-
nificance. In contrast, the coefficients of all the
legal-origin dummies are no longer statistically
different from zero.
22 The proportionality of the voting system decreases in
Italy (1994) and Venezuela (1989), while it increases in
France (1986), Japan (1994), New Zealand (1993), and the
Philippines (1996).
TABLE 3—DETERMINANTS OF SHAREHOLDER AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: CROSS-
SECTIONAL SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Shareholder protection
Constant 4.38*** 2.14*** 3.55***
(0.42) (0.36) (0.58)
Average proportionality 0.72*** 0.58***
(0.19) (0.20)
English legal origin 2.36*** 1.33**
(0.53) (0.58)
German legal origin 0.11 0.29
(0.60) (0.53)
Scandinavian legal origin 0.86 1.19**
(0.60) (0.52)
R2 0.416 0.522 0.656
Dependent variable: Employment protection
Constant 1.18*** 3.49*** 3.20***
(0.38) (0.20) (0.38)
Average proportionality 0.63*** 0.12
(0.17) (0.13)
English legal origin 2.75*** 2.54***
(0.30) (0.38)
German legal origin 1.03*** 0.94***
(0.34) (0.35)
Scandinavian legal origin 0.69** 0.76**
(0.34) (0.34)
R2 0.395 0.805 0.813
Number of observations 21 21 21
Notes: The dependent variables are “shareholder protection,” which is the anti-director rights
index designed by LLSV (1998), and “employment protection,” which is the EPL indicator by
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001). “Average proportionality” is the 1986–1990 average of
“proportionality” as defined in Table 3. “English, German, and Scandinavian legal origin” are
dummy variables that reflect the origin of the legal system, drawn from LLSV (1998).
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10-, 5-, and
1-percent level, respectively.
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In column 4, we report the corresponding
estimates with fixed-effects estimation. In this
case, the legal-origin variables cannot be in-
cluded, since they are constant by definition.
The coefficient of proportionality is larger in
absolute value (1.31) and more precisely es-
timated than in column 1 (1.02), where it was
obtained with random effects. The economic
significance of these estimates is also quite
large: changing the voting system from the av-
erage degree of proportionality (Proportional-
ity  1.77) to a pure majoritarian system
(Proportionality  0) is associated with an es-
timated increase in shareholder protection be-
tween 1.8 and 2.3—a large increase for a
variable that ranges between 0 and 6.
Another interesting finding that emerges
from Table 5 is that the coefficients of the time
dummies are almost monotonically increasing
with time, from approximately 0 in 1994 to
almost 0.5 in 2001. Therefore, over the 1990s
the shareholder protection index improved on
average by almost half a point, for reasons
independent of electoral systems. This finding
also implies that in this decade there was inter-
national convergence in shareholder protection.
C. Explaining Employment Protection in
OECD Countries
In Table 6, the same panel-data estimation is
carried out for employment protection. Since in
this case the dependent variable is the OECD
measure of employment protection, the panel is
limited to the 21 OECD countries for the 1990–
1998 interval.
As in Table 5, we start by estimating three
random effects regressions with calendar year
dummies. Column 1 shows that proportionality
by itself has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient. Column 2 indicates that En-
glish, Scandinavian, and German legal-origin
TABLE 4—PANEL DATA: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation
(overall)
Standard
deviation
(between)
Standard
deviation
(within)
Number of
observations
Number of
countries
Shareholder protection 3.31 1.22 1.15 0.40 382 45
Employment protection 2.21 1.14 1.14 0.24 210 21
Proportionality 1.77 1.22 1.25 0.17 382 45
Left 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.32 382 45
Center 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.18 382 45
Right 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.33 382 45
District size (million inhab.) 2.13 4.44 4.24 0.76 367 45
Tenure of democracy 3.90 2.31 2.35 0.30 382 45
Threshold 2.06 2.46 2.42 0.56 282 32
Competitiveness of democracy 0.90 0.30 0.29 0.10 382 45
Notes: The panel spans the 1993–2001 interval and includes 45 countries, which coincide with that of LLSV (1998), with the
exception of Hong Kong, Jordan, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. For “employment protection” only, the panel spans the 1990–1998
interval and includes the subset of countries listed in Table 2. “Shareholder protection” is the LLSV anti-director rights index
as updated by the responses to our questionnaires. “Employment protection” is the average of indicators on regular contracts
(procedural inconveniences, notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals, difficulty of dismissal) and
short-term contract (fixed-term and temporary), drawn from Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001). “Proportionality” equals 3 if 100
percent of seats are assigned via a proportional rule, 2 if the majority of seats are assigned by this rule, 1 if a minority of seats
is assigned proportionally, and 0 if no seats are assigned in this way. It is defined as PR  PLURALTY  HOUSESYS 
2, which are variables drawn from WBDPI, and defined in Beck et al. (2002). “Left,” “center,” and “right” are dummy
variables capturing political orientation of the executive as measured in the WBDPI. They do not sum to 1 because of the
presence of political parties that do not fit into left-center-right classification. “District size” is the average number of
inhabitants per district, in millions. It is computed as the mean number of representatives elected by each district in elections
for the lower house divided by the total number of seats (drawn from the WBDPI) and multiplied by million inhabitants
(drawn from the World Penn Tables). “Tenure of democracy” measures how long a country has been a democracy, measured
in decades. It equals the variable “tenure of system” (TENSYS) in the WBDPI, since all countries in our sample are
democracies. “Threshold” is defined as the minimum vote share that a party must obtain in order to take at least one seat in
systems where some seats are assigned via a proportional rule. Therefore, it does not apply to purely majoritarian systems.
“Competitiveness of democracy” equals 1 if the largest party has less than 75 percent of the seats (LIEC  7 in WBDPI),
and 0 otherwise.
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dummies are negatively correlated with em-
ployment protection, the effect being particu-
larly large for the English legal-origin dummy.
This implies that French legal-origin countries,
being the default case, feature a significantly
higher degree of employment protection. In col-
umn 3, political and legal variables are used
jointly as regressors, and their coefficients are
all seen to be significantly different from zero.
This is in striking contrast with the cross-
sectional results presented in column 3 of Ta-
ble 3, where the proportionality of the voting
system loses all explanatory power once the
legal-origin dummies are included in the regres-
sion. It also differs from the panel data esti-
mates obtained for shareholder protection in
Table 5, since for employment protection, legal
origin retains considerable explanatory power.
TABLE 5—DETERMINANTS OF SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.81*** 2.73*** 4.93*** 5.41***
(0.28) (0.22) (0.39) (0.20)
Average proportionality 1.02*** 1.04*** 1.31***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
English legal origin 1.21*** 0.18
(0.33) (0.50)
German legal origin 0.31 0.85
(0.45) (0.65)
Scandinavian legal
origin
0.06 0.99
(0.53) (0.77)
Year 1994 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 1995 0.13* 0.13 0.13* 0.13*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 1996 0.13* 0.13 0.13* 0.13*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 1997 0.14* 0.14 0.14* 0.14**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 1998 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 1999 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 2000 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.42***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Year 2001 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.47*** 0.47***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Estimation method ML random
effects
ML random
effects
ML random
effects
Fixed effects
Number of observations 382 382 382 382
Log-likelihood 232.57 274.61 230.52
R2 Overall:
0.110
Within:
0.410
Between:
0.090
Notes: The regression estimates are obtained from a panel of 45 countries over the 1993–2001
interval. The sample coincides with that of LLSV (1998) with the exception of Hong Kong,
Jordan, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka, which are missing in our sample. The dependent variable is
“shareholder protection,” which is the LLSV anti-director rights index as updated by the
responses to our questionnaires. “Average proportionality” is the average, computed over the
previous five years, of the “proportionality” indicator defined in Table 4. “English, German,
and Scandinavian legal origin” are dummy variables that reflect the origin of the legal system,
drawn from LLSV (1998). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively.
1023VOL. 95 NO. 4 PAGANO AND VOLPIN: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Fixed-effect estimates confirm the strong cor-
relation between proportionality and employ-
ment protection: in column 4 the coefficient of
proportionality is almost identical and as pre-
cisely estimated as in the random effect regres-
sion of column 1. It is also economically
significant: changing the voting system from the
average degree of proportionality to a pure ma-
joritarian system is associated with an estimated
increase in employee protection of 0.8 points, a
large effect for a variable ranging between 0.2
and 4.2 in the sample.
Table 6 also indicates that, on average, em-
ployment protection decreased in OECD coun-
tries during the 1990s: the coefficients of the
time dummies are decreasing with time, from
approximately 0 in 1991 to 0.3 in 1998. Since
the indicator has a lower bound at zero, this
suggests international convergence also in the
degree of employment protection.
TABLE 6—DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN OECD COUNTRIES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.51*** 3.41*** 2.61*** 1.53***
(0.25) (0.19) (0.28) (0.17)
Average proportionality 0.46*** 0.34*** 0.45***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
English legal origin 2.50*** 1.94***
(0.28) (0.34)
German legal origin 0.86*** 0.66*
(0.32) (0.35)
Scandinavian legal
origin
0.81*** 1.03***
(0.32) (0.35)
Year 1991 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1992 0.09* 0.08 0.09 0.09
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1993 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1994 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1995 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1996 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1997 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Year 1998 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Estimation method ML random
effects
ML random
effects
ML random
effects
Fixed effects
Number of observations 210 210 210 210
Log-likelihood 18.53 18.05 8.59
R2 Overall:
0.307
Within:
0.347
Between:
0.306
Notes: The regression estimates are obtained from a panel of 21 OECD countries listed in
Table 2 over the 1990–1998 interval. The dependent variable is “employment protection,”
which is the average of indicators on regular contracts and short-term contract, drawn from
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001). “Average proportionality” is the average, computed over the
previous five years, of the “proportionality” indicator defined in Table 4. “English, German,
and Scandinavian legal origin” are dummy variables that reflect the origin of the legal system,
drawn from LLSV (1998). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively.
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D. Robustness Check: Other Political
Variables
So far, our empirical analysis has focused on
the proportionality of the voting system, since
this political variable emerged directly from our
model as the relevant one. Other features of
political systems, however, may contribute to
shape regulatory outcomes.
Like proportionality, some of these features
have to do with the design of the voting
system or of the political system, such as the
average size of voting districts and the thresh-
old for representation in parliament. The po-
tential impact of some of these variables is
intrinsically related to the proportionality of
the voting system. The size of voting districts
is relevant for a majoritarian system but not
for a purely proportional one, and it is more
relevant the larger is the proportion of seats
assigned by a majoritarian mechanism. So it
makes sense to interact this variable with a
measure of “majoritarianism,” defined as the
complement to our proportionality measure.
Conversely, a voting threshold is present only
in proportional systems, and its impact is
likely to be larger the greater is the fraction of
seats assigned via such mechanism. So it
seems appropriate to interact it with our mea-
sure of proportionality.
Other potentially relevant political variables
relate to the behavior of voters rather than to the
design of the system. Such is the political color
of the executive, the degree of competition be-
tween political parties, and the length of dem-
ocratic tradition in the country.
In this section we explore whether adding
these variables to the baseline specifications of
our panel regressions (column 3 in Tables 5 and
6, respectively) affects the results concerning
the degree of proportionality. A potential by-
product of this exercise is to identify other po-
litical mechanisms affecting shareholder and
employment protection.
In Table 7 we perform a general-to-specific
specification search. Column 1 reports the esti-
mates of a random-effects regression for share-
holder protection which, beside our measure of
proportionality and the legal origin dummies,
includes all the political variables mentioned
above. In column 2 we retain only the variables
whose coefficients are significantly different
from zero at the 5-percent level: Proportionality
and Center.23 The coefficient of Proportionality
is still negative and precisely estimated, and
only slightly smaller in absolute value than in
Table 5. The positive coefficient of Center in-
dicates that shareholders enjoy better protection
in countries where the electorate is less polar-
ized between left- and right-wing parties. The
result can be reconciled with our model, where
the constituency that supports shareholder pro-
tection is assumed to be in the middle of the
political spectrum and to have looser ideologi-
cal allegiances to the two competing parties.
In columns 3 and 4, we repeat the specifica-
tion search for employment protection. In this
case, we cannot include Competitiveness of De-
mocracy among the explanatory variables, since
for OECD countries this variable always equals
1. Employment protection appears to be corre-
lated with a larger set of variables than share-
holder protection.
First, as in Table 6, the coefficients of both
proportionality and legal-origin variables retain
their sign and statistical significance, although
their absolute value is considerably reduced.24
Second, a higher voting threshold is associ-
ated with stronger employment protection. This
may reflect the fact that thresholds reduce the
significance of voters belonging to smaller, less
cohesive political groups, such as minority
shareholders, and by the same token they in-
crease the weight of larger, more cohesive ones,
such as employees.
Third, the tenure of democracy appears to be
inversely correlated with employment protec-
tion: younger democracies are more pro-
worker. Since this regression is estimated on
data for OECD countries, the youngest democ-
racies in the sample are those of countries such
as Spain, Portugal, and Greece, followed by
Germany, Japan, and Italy. It is likely that as
these countries emerged from former right-wing
dictatorships, the new democratic legislators
passed pro-worker legislation to ensure their
popular support.
23 If the regression is estimated with fixed effects (not
reported for brevity), only the coefficient of proportionality
is statistically different from zero at the 5-percent level.
24 As for shareholder protection regression, this result
survives also if the equation is estimated with fixed effects.
With this estimation method, however, the coefficients of
the other political variables are not significantly different
from zero at conventional significance levels.
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Finally, the political orientation of the exec-
utive (left, right, or center) appears to have no
additional explanatory power for employment
protection, once the other political variables and
the legal-origin dummies are included. In this
respect, the panel data evidence confirms the
cross-sectional findings by Botero et al. (2004),
who report that legal-origin variables wipe out
the effect of the political power of the left in
accounting for international variation in labor
regulation.
In summary, the evidence of Table 7 confirms
that the proportionality variable is the most signif-
icant political variable in explaining both share-
holder and employment protection, while legal-
origin dummies retain considerable explanatory
power for labor market regulation. In addition, the
estimates suggest that other political variables are
significantly related to the observed regulatory
outcomes, especially insofar as employment pro-
tection is concerned. Given the exploratory nature
of this evidence, more remains to be done to
exploit the observed variation in the data. For such
empirical efforts to be fruitful, the theory pre-
sented in this paper should be extended so as to
generate further predictions linking political vari-
ables to regulatory outcomes. We leave this task to
future research.
TABLE 7—ROBUSTNESS CHECK: OTHER POLITICAL VARIABLES
Dependent variable
Shareholder protection Employment protection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average proportionality 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.18** 0.19**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
District size  majoritarian 0.04 0.09
(0.08) (0.06)
Threshold  proportionality 0.01 0.03** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Competitiveness of democracy 0.11
(0.17)
Tenure of democracy 0.09 0.16*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Left 0.08 0.85*
(0.14) (0.45)
Center 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.87*
(0.16) (0.09) (0.47)
Right 0.06 0.84*
(0.15) (0.45)
English legal origin 0.06 1.74*** 1.35***
(0.47) (0.26) (0.28)
German legal origin 0.83 0.57** 0.52**
(0.59) (0.27) (0.26)
Scandinavian legal origin 0.55 0.52*
(0.73) (0.26)
Number of observations 367 382 210 210
Number of countries 45 45 21 21
Log-likelihood 211.55 216.13 0.16 4.19
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample spans the 1993–2001 interval and includes 45
countries, which coincide with that of LLSV (1998), with the exception of Hong Kong,
Jordan, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka. The dependent variable is “shareholder protection,” which is
the LLSV anti-director rights index as updated by the responses to our questionnaires. In
columns 3 and 4, the sample spans the 1990–1998 interval and includes the subset of
countries listed in Table 2. The dependent variable is “employment protection,” which is the
average of indicators on regular contracts and short-term contract, drawn from Nicoletti and
Scarpetta (2001). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 4, except for “majoritarian-
ism,” which equals 3—Proportionality. All explanatory variables are lagged once. Regres-
sions are estimated with maximum-likelihood random effects and include a constant and year
dummies (not reported). Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10-, 5-, and 1-percent level, respectively.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of the political
determinants of the degree of shareholder and
employment protection. Under proportional
voting, the political outcome is a low degree of
shareholder protection and a high degree of
employment protection. This benefits entrepre-
neurs and workers, while damaging outside
shareholders. Weak shareholder protection al-
lows entrepreneurs to extract high private ben-
efits of control, while strong worker protection
enables low-productivity workers to retain well-
paid jobs. In contrast, in a majoritarian system,
legislation will feature strong shareholder pro-
tection and weak employee protection, which is
the outcome preferred by outside shareholders.
This prediction is consistent with interna-
tional panel data evidence. The proportionality
of the voting system is significantly and nega-
tively correlated with shareholder protection in
a panel of 45 countries, and positively corre-
lated with employment protection in a panel
of 21 OECD countries. Also, other political
variables—such as ideological factors, district
size, voting thresholds, and the tenure of the
democratic system—appear to affect regulatory
outcomes. The origin of the legal system has
some additional explanatory power only for em-
ployment protection.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
By using (10), we can rewrite the problem as:
max
K
y
 x	 z
nK	 K
 AE
subject only to the constraint:
1 	
K 	 AE
y 
 x 	 z
nK 	 d
K  *.
Since by assumption Ny  1 and x  , the objective function is strictly increasing in K, while the
constraint is decreasing in K. Hence, the optimal policy requires the constraint to be binding. This
implies that E  * and that the optimal investment K* is given by (11). Substituting K* into the
entrepreneur’s objective function, one finds his indirect utility (12). Differentiating expression (11)
with respect to  yields:
K*

 K*
1	 *
1	 
1	 *y
 x	 z
n	 d
d
 0.
Similarly, differentiating expression (11) with respect to  yields:
K*

 K*

1	 *n
1	 
1	 *y
 x	 z
n	 d
z
 0.
Since it is immediate from (12) that U*E is increasing in K*, it is also increasing in  and decreasing
in .
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
For party A, maximizing the probability of winning given in (18) is equivalent to maximizing the
politically weighted social surplus U (qA)  ¥j sjjUj(qA). Using (3), (4), and (5), one can rewrite this
expression as:
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where   [EE  R0R  (W  EN)0W  ENW]/(E  R  W) is a weighted average of
the equity holdings in the economy, where the weights are the products of the size and the ideological
cohesion of the respective constituencies. Recall that the ideological cohesion of entrepreneurs E
and workers W equals  and that of the residual group is 0  . The first derivative of the
politicians’ objective function with respect to  is:
(A1) U


 
sE 	  K
D

and the first derivative with respect to  is:
(A2) U


 
sW 	 N 
1 	 xw  N
sE 	  
1 	 xw
where, in the second step, we have used the fact that sW  NsE. The sign of these two derivatives
coincides with that of the expression sE   . To determine the sign of the latter, notice that
equilibrium in the equity market requires that the total holdings of domestic equity by domestic
investors do not exceed the total stock of domestic equity
EE 
 RR 
 WW  E
where the inequality is strict if there are foreign shareholders. Using this inequality and the definition
of  , we find that
  sE 	 
 	 0 
RR 
 
W 	 ENW
E 
 R 
 W  sE
which implies that sE    0. Hence, the derivative (A1) is strictly negative and the
derivative (A2) is strictly positive. Therefore, the optimal platform offered by both parties
under the proportional electoral rule is a corner solution: P  0 and P   . In equilibrium,
party A wins with probability p*A 
1
2   sE(N  1)/ , and party B with probability 1 
p*A.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
We proceed in two steps. First, we find a sufficient condition for the existence of a
symmetrical Nash equilibrium in which district 2 is pivotal and therefore the political outcome is
(0, 1). Next, we prove that this is the unique symmetrical Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
First, notice that the candidate symmetrical Nash equilibrium satisfies the following three
conditions: (i) each party wins district 2 with 1⁄2 probability; (ii) each party wins the district
where it is ideologically favored; (iii) deviating from the strategy of maximizing the probability
of winning district 2 is not optimal. Notice that, taken together, conditions (i) and (ii) imply that
the party that wins district 2 wins the elections, i.e., that it is the pivotal district. Suppose for
the moment that condition (iii) holds. Then the only symmetrical equilibrium is one in which
party A maximizes pA in (19) and party B maximizes 1  pA. To do so, they will both announce
the platform qM  (M, M)  ( , 0), and win the majority of the votes in district 2 with 1⁄2
probability, as suggested by condition (i).
Condition (iii) also implies that the party winning in district 2 wins also in another district:
otherwise, it would not win the elections. In particular, in equilibrium, party A wins in district 1 and
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party B wins in district 3, provided  
1
2 . To show this, notice that Prob( p˜A,E 
1
2)  1 is equivalent
to Prob(˜   )  1 in a symmetrical equilibrium, which holds if   12 . The same condition implies
that party B wins in district 3, i.e., Prob( p˜B,W  12)  1.Now we turn to condition (iii) itself and establish that it holds for sufficiently large values of
 . Consider first whether party B has the incentive to deviate from its candidate equilibrium
strategy by competing for votes in districts 1 and 3. The deviation, denoted by platform qˆ, is
optimal if
max
qˆ
minUE
qˆ	 UE
qA	  
 12 , UW
qˆ	 UW
qA
  
 12  12 .
By substituting from equations (3), (4), and (5), and recalling that in the candidate equilibrium qA 
( , 0), this becomes
max
qˆ
min
1	 ED
ˆ 	 D
 	 E
1	 xˆNw	  ,

1	 NW
1	 xˆw	 WD
ˆ 	 D
 
 } 0.
The deviation is not profitable if the first term (1  E)[D(ˆ )  D( )]  E(1  x)ˆNw   is
negative. This is ensured by condition   (1  *)[D(0)  D( )], under which the maximal value
of this expression is negative.
Consider next if party A has the incentive to deviate from its candidate equilibrium strategy by
competing for districts 1 and 3. The deviation, denoted by platform q, is optimal if:
max
q
minUW
q	 UW
qB	  
 12 , UE
q	 UE
qB
  
 12  12 .
By substituting from equations (3), (4), and (5), this becomes
max
q
min
1	 NW
1	 xw	 WD
	 D
 	  , 
1	 ED
	 D
 
 E
1	 xwN
 } 0.
For the deviation not to be profitable, it is sufficient that the first term (1  NW)(1  x)w 
W[D()  D( )]   is negative. Condition   (1  WN)(1  x)w ensures that this term is
always negative, since it makes its maximal value negative.
In conclusion, a sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetrical Nash equilibrium is
  max 12 , 
1	 *D
0	 D
 , 
1	 WN
1	 xw.
Finally, we show that ( , 0) is the unique equilibrium outcome in symmetrical strategies. Indeed,
for any policy platform (, )  ( , 0) offered by part A, party B can increase its probability
of winning by offering a platform (  , ) for any   0. With this deviation, party B is
elected with probability 1, by winning districts 2 and 3. Similarly, for any policy platform (,
)  ( , 0) offered by party B, party A can increase its probability of winning by offering a
platform (,   ) for any   0. With this deviation, party A is elected with probability 1,
by winning districts 1 and 2.
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